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Family Law. Furiav. Furia,692 A.2d 327 (R.I. 1997). The proper
distribution of a plaintiffs pension is the monthly payment of an
amount equal to one-half of the monthly pension benefits which
the plaintiff would have received had she chosen to retire.
In Furiav. Furia' (FuriaII), the Rhode Island Supreme Court
expanded a prior ruling2 when it decided the equitable distribution
of a spouse-teacher's pension. In 1992, the court held that the pension of a public school teacher was subject to equitable distribution.3 However, Mrs. Furia-the plaintiff in Furia II-while
vested in her pension plan, chose not to retire. 4 In Furia11, the
court confronted the question of how to distribute a spouse5
teacher's pension before the participating spouse actually retired.
FACTS AND TRAVEL

The plaintiff, Lucille Furia, and the defendant, Richard Furia,
divorced in May of 1992 on the grounds of irreconcilable differences. 6 The family court judge provided for equitable distribution
of most of the marital property. 7 During the Furia divorce proceeding, a supreme court case, Moran v. Moran,8 was pending on the
issue of equitable distribution of a spouse's pension. 9 The family
court judge reserved a determination regarding the distribution of
Mrs. Furia's teacher's pension, pending that decision. The Moran
court held that the pension of a public school teacher was subject to
equitable distribution.' 0 However, Mrs. Furia, though vested in
her pension plan, chose not to retire. Therefore, the Moran decision did not apply to the Furia case." The family court judge certified to the Rhode Island Supreme Court the question whether a
nonparticipating spouse had a right to receive pension benefits
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.

8.
9.
10.
11.

692 A.2d 327 (R.I. 1997) (FuriaII).
See Furia v. Furia, 638 A.2d 548 (R.I. 1994) (FuriaI).
See Moran v. Moran, 612 A.2d 26, 33 (R.I. 1992).
See Furia II, 692 A.2d at 328.
See id.
See id.
See id.

612 A.2d 26 (R.I. 1992).
See id. at 33.
See id. at 33.
See Furia 11, 692 A.2d at 328.
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from the state employees' retirement system before the participat12
ing spouse actually retired.
BACKGROUND

Rhode Island has an equitable distribution statute 13 that enumerates four factors the trial judge must consider when dividing
up the marital estate upon divorce. 14 Those four factors are: (1)
the length of the marriage; (2) the conduct of the parties during the
marriage; (3) the contribution of each party in the acquisition,
preservation or appreciation in value of his/her respective estate
and (4) the contribution and services of either party as a homemaker.' 5 The concept of equitable distribution has evolved as a
means by which the law can divide marital assets. 16 Marriage is,
among other things, an economic partnership between two people
7
striving to make a better life for themselves.'
When a married couple divorces, section 15-5-16.1 of the
Rhode Island General Laws provides the factors that enable the
court to recognize on a practical level the existence of that partnership, to consider each spouse's relative efforts to foster it and to
divide fairly the assets of that joint enterprise. Equitable distribution of marital property takes into consideration all of the tangible
and intangible contributions each party has made over the course
of the marriage.' 8
Rhode Island views pensions as marital property subject to equitable distribution.' 9 The pension represents delayed compensation for work performed over the course of the marriage. It is an
12.

See id. (citing Furia v. Furia, 638 A.2d 548 (R.I. 1994) (FuriaI)).

13. R.I. Gen. Laws § 15-5-16.1 (1996).
14. See id.; see also Whited v. Whited, 478 A.2d 567, 569 (R.I. 1984) (listing
determinative factors when dividing the marital estate).
15. See R.I. Gen. Laws § 15-5-16.1.
16. See Stevenson v. Stevenson, 511 A.2d 961, 964 (R.I. 1986).
17. See id.
18. See id.
19. See id. (holding that a police officer's pension is a marital asset for the
purpose of property division upon divorce); see also Duke v. Duke, 675 A.2d 822
(R.I. 1996) (applying the same rationale to firefighters' pensions); Casey v. Casey,

494 A.2d 80 (R.I. 1985) (awarding the husband a portion of a vested pension fund
under the terms of the division of marital assets); Whited v. Whited, 478 A.2d 567
(R.I. 1984) (finding no abuse of discretion where the trial judge did not award the
wife an interest in the husband's boats, medical equipment or small pension).
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enforceable contract right, and therefore a form of property. 20 A
pension is reasonably analogous in form to a forced savings account whose funds will become available to the parties upon
21
retirement.
In Moran v. Moran,22 the Rhode Island Supreme Court held
that the pension of a public school teacher was subject to equitable
distribution. 23 The court adopted the rationale set forth in a Pennsylvania Supreme Court case, Young v. Young, 24 that pensions in
general are subject to equitable distribution. 25 The Moran court
discussed the basis for viewing pensions as marital property subject to equitable distribution. 26 Pension benefits represent compensation for marital effort. They are substitutes for current
earnings which would have increased the marital standard of living or would have been converted into other assets divisible at dissolution. It is just to divide those benefits because in most cases
the retirement benefits constitute the most valuable asset the
couple has acquired. Also, they both have relied upon their pension payments for security in their older years. 27 Thus, in Moran,
the husband's municipal pension was not exempt from
distribution.
In FuriaI,28 the supreme court answered a certified question
from the family court. The question arose in the context of the fam29
ily court's attempt to distribute equitably the Furia property.
Mr. Furia wanted to receive his portion of Mrs. Furia's pension.
Mrs. Furia, while vested, chose not to retire. The supreme court
held that Mr. Furia was not entitled to collect the pension benefits
per se because Mrs. Furia had not retired. However, depending on
20. See Stevenson, 511 A.2d at 964.
21. See id.
22. 612 A.2d 26 (R.I. 1992).
23. See id. at 33.
24. 488 A.2d 264 (Pa. 1984) (holding that courts may attach a municipal police
pension to satisfy an obligation of support).
25. See Moran, 612 A.2d at 33 (following Young, 488 A.2d 264 (Pa. 1984)).
26. Id. at 32.
27. See id. at 33 (citing 3 Rutkin, Family Law and Practice § 37.01(1), at 37-81
(1985)).
28. 638 A.2d 548 (R.I. 1994). Cf. supra note 10.
29. See id. at 549. The certified question was "[wihether the non-participating
spouse has a right to receive pension benefits pursuant to a Qualified Domestic
Relations Order prior to the retirement date of the participatory spouse in a
Teacher's/State pension or must he wait until his spouse actually retires and receives pension benefits."
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the equitable distribution by the family court, Mr. Furia may not
have to wait until Mrs. Furia retired to begin collecting the value
of benefits he would receive if she had retired. 30 That is because if
the family court awarded Mr. Furia a portion of Mrs. Furia's pension, then Mrs. Furia would have to give him the equivalent of that
award until she actually retired.3 1
Applying this holding, the family court judge awarded Mr.
Furia one-half of the estimated actuarial value of Mrs. Furia's pension. He ordered Mrs. Furia to pay $30,000 by January 31, 1996,
and to execute a promissory note for $180,987.50 including interest
of 7% per year. 3 2 Additionally, Mrs. Furia must make monthly
payments not to exceed $1250, with a balloon payment 3 3 for the
total balance due one month after Mrs. Furia reached sixty-five
years of age. 34 Mrs. Furia may deduct the interest on the note
from her taxable income, while Mr. Furia must report that interest
as income. 35 However, since Mrs. Furia had not retired, she did
not have pension benefits available to pay that court award. Mrs.
36
Furia timely appealed that decision.
ANALYSIS AND HOLDING

The supreme court, in Furia II, expanded the FuriaI holding.
The FuriaII court explained that the family court's interpretation
of FuriaI assumed Mrs. Furia had retired in December 199537 and
would live out her estimated life expectancy. The family court allocated Mrs. Furia's pension as if it were a lump-sum payment to her
of the approximate cash value of the pension benefits Mrs. Furia
would receive during her life. 3 8 This was an inequitable distribution of Mrs. Furia's actual pension benefits. It did not consider
that Mrs. Furia may die before retiring and never collect any actual pension benefits. Had that occurred, Mr. Furia would have
30. See id. at 553.
31. See id.
32. See Furia 1I, 692 A.2d at 328.
33. A balloon payment is the final payment of principal under a balloon note,
commonly representing essentially the entire principal. See Black's Law Dictionary 143 (6th ed. 1990).
34. See Furia 11, 692 A.2d at 328.
35. See id.
36. See id.
37. December of 1995 is the month the family court entered the original order
for the distribution of the pension. See id.
38. See id.
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received one-half of the estimated value of Mrs. Furia's lifetime
pension. Also, the court posited, if Mrs. Furia died two months after retiring, then she would have collected "virtually none" of her
pension benefits, but Mr. Furia would have received one-half of the
39
total value of the pension.
In Furia 11, the Rhode Island Supreme Court expanded the
FuriaI ruling. The FuriaII court held that the proper distribution
of Mrs. Furia's pension is the payment each month of an amount
equal to one-half of the monthly pension benefits that Mrs. Furia
would have received had she chosen to retire.40 Additionally,
FuriaII held that after her retirement, Mrs. Furia should continue
to pay Mr. Furia one-half of her actual pension benefits on a
monthly basis throughout her retirement. Mr. Furia must pay
41
taxes on the monthly payments received from Mrs. Furia.
CONCLUSION

Furia II raises a tax issue. Normally, alimony is tax deductible by the payor, and taxable to the receiver. 42 In Furia1I, Mrs.
Furia decided not to retire. She still had to give Mr. Furia the
money he would have received if she had retired. This payment
comes out of her salary, under the title of equitable distribution.
Her paycheck is subject to federal and state taxation. Thus, Mrs.
Furia-here, the worker-has the tax liability, and Mr. Furia-the
non-working spouse-receives the money tax-free. In FuriaII, the
Rhode Island Supreme Court decided that the recipient of half of
the ex-spouse's pension must pay tax on that money. The Internal
Revenue Service has stated otherwise. Unless a person can afford
to pay their ex-spouse, the practical effect of FuriaII may be that it
forces one into an undesired retirement.
Vicki J. Ray

39.
40.
41.
42.

Id. at 329.
Id. at 328.
See id.
See I.R.C. §§ 71(a), 215(a) (1996).
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Family Law. In re Kyle S., 692 A.2d 329 (R.I. 1997). Interpretation by the Department of Children, Youth, and Families (DCYF)
of section 15-7-7(1)(b)(iv) of the Rhode Island General Laws, as
amended by 1994 Public Laws chapter 233 section 1, involuntarily
terminating parental custody of children where prior siblings had
voluntarily been released to the state, does not comport with the
legislative intent of the statute.1 The portion of the statute including prior terminations as one of the requisite conditions for paren2
tal unfitness does not include prior voluntary terminations.

FACTS AND TRAVEL

Kyle S. (Kyle) was born on March 18, 1995 to Janice Woodward Sabatini and Thomas Sabatini (Sabatinis).3 The Sabatinis
had extensive involvement with DCYF prior to Kyle's birth. Previ4
ous allegations of abuse were documented against both parents.
Two months prior to Kyle's birth, the Sabatinis voluntarily agreed
to relinquish their rights to his older siblings.5 In granting the termination, the family court made no finding of parental unfitness.6
Based on the couple's prior dealings with DCYF, the hospital authorized Kyle's seventy-two hour detention and notified DCYF of
his birth. 7 During the seventy-two-hour detention, DCYF obtained
an ex-parte detention order from the family court and took temporary custody of Kyle. Soon thereafter, Kyle was placed in nonrelative foster care.8
On the basis of the prior voluntary terminations, DCYF filed a
petition to involuntarily terminate the Sabatinis' parental rights to
1. In re Kyle S., 692 A.2d 329 (R.I. 1997) (holding that DCYF's interpretation did not comport with the legislative intent of the statute and the supreme
court did not need to address the constitutional issue of equal protection).

2. See id. at 334.
3. See id. at 330.
4. See id.

5. In August of 1994, DCYF filed involuntary petitions to terminate the
Sabatinis' parental rights. Before the involuntary petitions could be considered by
the family court, the Sabatinis voluntarily agreed to terminate their parental
rights to Kyle's five older siblings. See id.
6. Because the Sabatinis voluntarily consented to the termination of Kyle's
five siblings, a parental-fitness hearing was unnecessary. See In re Kyle, 692 A.2d
at 330; see also R.I. Gen. Laws §§ 15-7-5, -6 (1956).

7.

See In re Kyle, at 692 A.2d at 330.

8.

See id.
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Kyle pursuant to section 15-7-7(1)(b)(iv) of the Rhode Island General Laws. 9 The Sabatinis moved to dismiss on the basis that section 15-7-7(1)(b)(iv) only authorizes involuntary termination of
parental rights upon a judicial finding of parental unfitness.' 0
DCYF contended that section 15-7-7(1)(b)(iv) applies whether the
termination is involuntary or voluntary. 1 ' DCYF argued that the
statute should be read to encompass both involuntary and voluntary terminations, even though it is silent regarding the nature of
the previous termination proceeding. 12 The Rhode Island Supreme
Court agreed with the Sabatinis and found that the intent of the
General Assembly would be compromised if section 15-7-7(1)(b)(iv)
were read to include voluntary terminations. This "would produce
3
results contrary to the policies of the underlying act."'
9. R.I. Gen. Laws § 15-7-7(1)(b)(iv) (1956), as amended by 1994 Pub. Laws
ch. 233 § 1. The 1996 reenactment of R.I. Gen. Laws § 15-7-7(1)(b)(iv)
redesignated subsection (1)(b)(iv) as (a)(2)(iv) but left undisturbed its language.
References will be made to (1)(b)(iv), the statutory designation that was in effect at
the time DCYF sought the petition.
10. See In re Kyle, 692 A.2d at 330; see also Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745
(1982) (holding that parental rights may not be involuntarily terminated absent a
fitness hearing where, by clear and convincing evidence, the parents are determined unfit).

11. See In re Kyle, 692 A.2d at 330.
12. Rhode Island General Laws § 15-7-7(a)(2)(iv) provides in pertinent part:
(a) The court shall, upon a petition duly filed after notice to the parent
and hearing thereon, terminate any and all legal rights of the parent to
the child, including the right to notice of any subsequent adoption proceedings involving the child, if the court, by clear and convincing evidence,
finds as a fact by clear and convincing evidence that: ...
(2) The parent is unfit by reason of conduct or conditions seriously
detrimental to the child; such as, but not limited to, the following: ...
(iv) The child has been placed with the department for children,
youth, and families and the court has previously terminated parental
rights to another child who is a member of the same family and the parent
continues to lack the ability or willingness to respond to services which
would rehabilitate the parent and provided further that the court finds it
is improbable that an additional period of services would result in reunification within a reasonable period of time considering the child's age and
the need for a permanent home.
R.I. Gen. Laws § 15-7-7 (a)(2)(iv) (1956), as amended by 1994 Pub. Laws ch. 223 § 1
(formerly R.I. Gen. Laws § 15-7-7 (1)(b)(iv) (emphasis added)).
13. See id.at 333 (providing an example of a young mother who gave away her
child voluntarily only to find years later she risks the loss of a subsequent child to
DCYF).
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BACKGROUND

The purpose of section 15-7-7 is to provide children who are in
peril with a permanent and safe placement. 14 A parent's rights to
the custody and management of a child may be terminated by any
one of three statutory mechanisms. 15 Pursuant to section 15-7-5 or
section 15-7-6, a parent may voluntarily relinquish his or her
rights to a child without explanation or reason. 16 Under this statutory scheme, the legislature's purview was that a finding of parental unfitness is unnecessary because the surrender of custody is
voluntarily. The statute further distinguishes voluntary terminations by remaining silent about state-sponsored rehabilitative
services. However, under involuntary termination, the state must
provide the parent with services designed to encourage and
strengthen the parental relationship. 1 7 When involuntary termination occurs, section 15-7-7 dictates that the trial judge must be
persuaded by clear and convincing evidence that a parent is either
14. See id. at 332.
15. See id. The three mechanisms are: (1) section 15-7-5, (2) section 15-7-6
and (3) section 15-7 -7. Similar statutory mechanisms exist throughout the nation.
See, e.g., Ala. Code § 26-18-2 (1994); Alaska Stat. § 29.23.180(c)(3) (Michie 1996);
Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 8-531 (1972); Ark. Code Ann. § 27.3178 (598.19b) (Michie
1994); Cal. Trial Court Code Rule 1463 § 366.26 (1995); Colo. Rev. Stat. § 19-3-604
(1987); Conn. Gen Stat. § 45a-717(h)(5) (1994); Del. Code Ann. tit. 13 § 1103
(1994); D.C. Code Ann. § 16-2351 (1994); Fla. Stat. Ann. § 39.46 (West 1988); Ga.
Code Ann. § 15-11-81 (1995); Haw. Rev. Stat. § 571-61 (1995); Idaho Code § 162005 (1963); 705 Ill. Comp. Stat. 405/2-29 (1993); Ind. Code § 31-6-5-3 (1978); Kan.
Stat. Ann. § 38-1583 (1994); Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 625.090 (Baldwin 1995); La.
Rev. Stat. Ann. § 1001 (1995); Mass Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 28A, § 1 (1995). Md. Code
Ann. Fain. Law § 5-312 (1995); Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 22 § 4055 (1983); Mich.
Stat. Ann. § 27.3178 (598.19a) (1994); Minn. Stat. Ann. § 260.221 (1995); Miss.
Code Ann. § 93-15-103 (1995); Mo. Rev. Stat. § 211.447 (1982); Mont. Code Ann.
§ 41-3-609 (1993); Neb. Rev. Stat. § 43-292 (1993); Nev. Stat. § 128.005 (1995);
N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 170-C:5 (1983); N.M. Stat. Ann. § 32A-4-28 (Michie 1978);
N.Y. Social Services Law § 384-b (McKinney 1995); N.J. Stat. Ann. § 9:2-19 (1967);
N.C. Gen Stat. § 7A-289.22 (1985); N.D. Cert. Code § 27-20-44 (1991); Ohio Rev.
Code Ann. § 2151.353 (Baldwin 1995); Okla. Stat. tit. 10 § 1130 (1995); Or. Rev.
Stat. § 419.523 (1979); 23 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 2511 (West 1993); S.C. Code Ann.
§ 20-7-1572 (Law. Co-op. 1992); S.D. Codified Laws § 25-5A-7.1 (1992); Tenn. Code
Ann. § 37-1-147 (1991); Tex. Fain. Code Ann. § 161.001 (West 1996); Utah Code
Ann. § 78-3a-402 (Michie 1996); Va. Code Ann. § 16.1-283 (1995); Vt. Stat. Ann. tit.
33, § 55 (1991); Wash. Rev. Code § 13.34.180 (1994); W. Va. Code § 49-6-5 (1988);
Wis. Stat. Ann. § 48.415 (West 1995); Wyo. Stat. § 14-2-309 (1995).
16. See R.I. Gen. Laws §§ 15-7-5, -6 (1956).
17. See In re Kyle, 692 A.2d at 331-32; see also §§ 15-7-7(1)(a), (1)(b)(i),
(1)(b)(iii).
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unfit or incapable of providing a child with proper care.' 8 The statute enumerates seven conditions which outline conditions of parental unfitness. 19 A positive finding on any one of the seven
grounds allows the court to conclude a parent is unfit.
ANALYSIS AND HOLDING

The primary question addressed by the court was whether section 15-7-7(1)(b)(iv), on its face, includes both voluntary and involuntary terminations of parental rights. 20 The court's response to
this primary inquiry was negative. 2 1 The rationale given by the
court rested primarily on an aggregate reading of all of the statute's provisions. 2 2 The Rhode Island Supreme Court reasoned that
reading the statute to include both voluntary and involuntary terminations would undermine the integrity of the underlying legislation by eliminating the distinction between sections 15-7-5, 15-7-6
and 15-7-7.23 If the statute applied to voluntary terminations,
then DCYF would have unfettered discretion to intervene in the
subsequent births of mothers who had voluntarily given up prior
18. R.I. Gen. Laws § 15-7-7 (1956); see also In re Kristina L., 520 A.2d 574,
579-80 (R.I. 1987).
19. The grounds justifying termination include:
(1) the willful neglect of a parent to "provide proper care and maintenance for the child for a period of at least one year where financially able
to do so," (2) the "le]motional illness, mental illness, mental deficiency or
institutionalization of a parent... of such a duration as to render it improbable for the parent to care for the child for an extended period of
time," (3) "[c]onduct toward any child of a cruel or abusive nature," (4)
placement of the child in DCYF custody and the chronic substance-abuse
problem of a parent that prevents the return of the child within a reasonable period, (5) placement of the child in the custody of DCYF "and the
court has previously terminated parental rights to another child" in the
family, and the parent continues to fail to "respond to services which
would rehabilitate the parent," and the court finds it improbable that additional services would result in reunification of the family, (6) placement
of the child in the custody of DCYF for at least twelve months, during
which the parents have been offered services to correct the situation, but
it is unlikely that the child will be able to return to the parents' care
within a reasonable time, and (7) a parent's abandonment of the child.
See In re Kyle, 692 A.2d at 332 n.8 (citing R.I. Gen. Laws § 15-7-7 (1956), as
amended by 1994 Pub. Laws ch. 223, § 1).
20. See In re Kyle S., 692 A.2d at 330.
21. See id.
22. See id.
23. Section 15-7-5 and section 15-7-6 do not require a finding of unfitness,
while section 15-7-7 does require a finding of unfitness by the family court.
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children. In doing so, an independent determination of whether
the parent was able to care for the child would never occur. The
court reasoned that eliminating this distinction would make little
24
sense, given the purpose of the legislation.
Allowing section 15-7-7 to apply to voluntary terminations
would radically alter the parental-fitness portion of the legislation.
Under section 15-7-7, the family court must first have a hearing to
determine if the parents are "unfit" by clear and convincing evidence. 2 5 Giving DCYF the option of terminating parental rights to
a subsequent child based on previous voluntary terminations renders the threshold inquiry of parental fitness irrelevant. The
agency could use past voluntary terminations under section 15-7-5
or section 15-7-6 as a loophole for evading the requirements of section 15-7-7. The absence of such an inquiry would eliminate any
concrete distinction between terminating on a voluntary basis versus an involuntary basis and cast away the equal protection requirement of establishing the parents as unfit.2 6 In the case of the
Sabatinis, Kyle would be extricated from their care without a determination of their current ability to care for him. Finally, the
court concluded that if section 15-7-7 was read to include past voluntary terminations, then it would have the effect of discouraging
future voluntary terminations that may be in the child's best
7
interest.2
CONCLUSION

In refusing to adopt DCYF's interpretation of section 15-77(1)(b)(iv), the court gives parents who have voluntarily terminated their parental rights in the past, but have subsequent children, the right to a hearing on their fitness to care for the new
child. 28 The Rhode Island Supreme Court reasoned that holding
otherwise would circumvent legislative intent and cause results
24. See In re Kyle, 692 A.2d at 333.
25. R.I. Gen. Laws § 15-7-7 (1956).
26. It could be argued the denial of a hearing on fitness impinges on the parent's rights under the Due Process Clause. See U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1; R.I.
Const. Art I, § 2. However, the court in In re Kyle never had to address this point.
In re Kyle, 692 A.2d at 334.
27. See In re Kyle, 692 A.2d at 333.
28. See id. at 334; see also supra note 13.
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unintended by the underlying legislative rationale. 2 9 The adoption
of such an interpretation of section 15-7-7(1)(b)(iv) could have the
unintended result of deterring parents from voluntarily terminating parental rights for the fear that in the future the state would
use the previous voluntary termination as a pretext to involuntarily terminate subsequent children. As the goal of the statute is to
foster better care for the children of the state, this result would not
comport with the underlying intent of the statute nor the goals of
30
DCYF.
William J. Powers, IV

29. See Wayne Distributing Co. v. Rhode Island Comm'n for Human Rights,
673 A.2d 457, 460 (R.I. 1996); Sorenson v. Colibri Corp., 650 A.2d 125, 128 (R.I.
1994) (addressing the interpretation of legislative intent behind statutory
schemes).
30. The court has noted that it is the duty of DCYF to make reasonable efforts
to encourage and strengthen the parental relationship before the termination of
rights is effected. See In re Ann Marie, 461 A.2d 394, 395 (R.I. 1983) (citing In re
William, Susan and Joseph, 448 A.2d 1250, 1255 (R.I. 1982)). Cf In re Kristina L.,
520 A.2d 574, 581 (R.I. 1987) (holding that, where DCYF imposed its own values
regarding proper familial relationships and found foster parents who allowed the
child to live in more comfortable means, the agency did not make reasonable efforts to restore relationship between child and parent).

